Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons
Faculty Publications
1987

“Syndrome” Evidence
Paul C. Giannelli

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Evidence Commons, and the Litigation Commons

Repository Citation
Giannelli, Paul C., "“Syndrome” Evidence" (1987). Faculty Publications. 403.
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications/403

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Case
Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

I
Spring 1987

Vol. 10, No. 2

"SYNDROME" EVIDENCE
Paul C. Giannelli
Professor of Law
·Case Western Reserve University
and

Donna Mitchell
Class of 198~A n
C.WR.U. Law Sc/fflrnR?

The last decade has seen an increased use of scientific evidence in criminal prosecutions. As part of this
development the courts have been faced with the admissibility of evidence based upon the social sciences. The
latest edition of McCormick contains the following
commentary:
In a growing number of cases, litigants have sought to
introduce expert testimony as to the scientifically
constructed or validated profiles. Women accused of
murdering their husbands have pointed to the
"battered wife syndrome" to support a plea of selfdefense. Prosecutors in sexual abuse cases have
relied on the "rape trauma syndrome" to negate a
claim of consent or to explain conflicting statements of
the complainant. In child abuse and homicide cases,
prosecutors have called witnesses to establish that
defendants exhibited the "battering parent syndrome."
C. McCormick, Evidence 635 (3d ed. 1984).
rhis article briefly examines several issues relating to
vhat may be called "syndrome" evidence.
BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
The battered woman syndrome (BWS) describes a
1attern of violence inflicted on a woman by her mate. Dr.
.enore Walker, one of the principal researchers in this
eld, describes a battered woman as follows:
A battered woman is a woman who is repeatedly
subjected to any forceful physical or psychological
behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without any concern for her
rights. Battered women include wives or women in any
form of intimate relationships with men.
Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered
woman, the couple must go through the battering
cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an
abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a
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second time, and she remains in the situation, she is
defined as a battered woman~ L. Walker, The Battered
Woman xv (1979).
The violence associ?ted with this type of relationship is
neither constant nor random. Instead, it follows a pattern.
Dr. Walker has identified a three stage cycle of violence.
/d. at 55-70. The first stage is the "tension building"
phase, during which small abusive episodes occur.
These episodes gradually escalate over a period of time.
The tension continues to build until the second stagethe acute battering phase- erupts. During this phase, in
which most injuries occur, the battering is out of control.
Psychological abuse in the form of threats of future harm
is also prevalent. The third phase is a calm loving period
in which the batterer is contrite, seeks forgiveness, and
promises to refrain from future violence. This phase
provides a positive reinforcement for the woman to
continue the relationship in the hope that the violent
behavior will not recur. The cycle then repeats itself. In
addition, the batterer is often extremely jealous of the
woman's time and attemtioll, a factor that further isolates
her from friends and outside support. Note, Self-Defense:
Battered Woman Syndrome on Trial, 20 Cal. W.L. Rev.
485, 487-88 (1984). Numerous obstacles, both psychological and economic, often prevent the battered spouse
from leaving her mate; she feels "trapped in a deadly
situation." Walker, Thyfault & Browne, Beyond the Juror's
Ken: Battered Women, 7 Vt. L. Rev. 1, 12 (1982). Caught
in this cycle, the battered woman sometimes strikes back
and kills.
Courts and scientists have accepted the validity of the
battered woman syndrome. See Fennell v. Goolsby, 630
F. Supp. 451,459 {E.D. Pa. 1985)("The general acceptance of expert testimony on the battered woman
syndrome has been acknowledged by legal authorities
as well as the scientific community."). One commentator,
however, has challenged its scientific basis:
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The work of Lenore Walker, the leading researcher on
battered woman syndrome, is unsound and largely
irrelevant to the central issues ...The Walker cycle
theory suffers from significant methodological and
interpretive flaws that render it incapable of explaining
why an abused woman strikes out at her mate when
she does. Similarly, Walker's application of learned
helplessness to the situation of battered women does
not account tor the actual behavior of many women
who remain in battering relationships. Note, The
Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense: A Legal
and Empirical Dissent, 72 Va. L. Rev. 619, 647 (1986).

woman's state of mind be accurately and fairly understood." State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 196,478 A.2d 364, 372
(1984). In addition, another court has admitted BWS
evidence for the purpose of explaining a battered
woman's conduct after killing her mate. People v. Minnis, (
118 Ill. App. 3d 345, 356-57, 455 N.E.2d 209, 217-18
(1983).
A second issue is whether BWS evidence is a proper
subject for expert testimony. Several courts have held
that this subject is "within the understanding of the jury"
and thus inappropriate for expert testimony. Fielder v.
State, 683 S.W.2d 565, 594 (Tex. Grim. App. 1985); State
v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 521, 423 N.E.2d 137, 140
(1981). Most courts disagree, finding that "a battering
relationship embodies psychological and societal
features that are not well understood by lay observers."
State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 209, 478 A.2d 364, 379 (1984).
See also lbn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626,
634-35 (D.C. 1979), on remand, 455 A.2d 893 (D.C. 1983);
Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 618-19, 277 S.E.2d 678, 683
(1981); People v. Torres, 128 Misc. 2d 129, 134, 488
N.Y.S.2d 358,362 (Sup. Ct. 1985); State v. Hill, 287 S.C.
398, 339 S.E.2d 121, 122 (1986); State v. Allery, 101
Wash. 2d 591, 597, 682 P.2d 312, 316 (1984).

Admissibility
The admissibility of evidence of the battered woman
syndrome has divided the courts. See generally Annat.,
Admissibility of Expert Opinion Testimony on Battered
Wife or Battered Woman Syndrome, 18 A.L.R.4th 1154
(1982). An analysis of the admissibility of such evidence
raises several issues. The first issue concerns the
relevancy of BWS evidence. Typically, the evidence is
offered in support of self-defense claim in a homicide
prosecution. A few courts have declared BWS evidence
to be simply irrelevant to a self-defense claim. See Fielder v. State, 683 S.W.2d 565, 593 (Tex. Grim. App. 1985);
People v. White, 90 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 1072, 414 N.E.2d
196, 200 (1980); State v. Necaise, 466 So. 2d 660, 663-65
(La. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518,
521, 423 N.E.2d 137, 140 (1981). See also State v. Martin,
666 S.W.2d 895, 899 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984)(expert testimony not admissible since prima facie case of self-defense
not made); State v. Moore, 72 Or. App. 454, 459, 695 P.2d
985,987-88 (1985)(witness not qualified to testify about
BWS).
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A final issue relates to the scientific basis for BWS
evidence. Some courts have excluded expert testimony
on this subject because its scientific validity has not been
sufficiently established. lbn:ramas v. United States, 455
A.2d 893 (D.C. 1983); State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d
518, 521-22, 423 N.E.2d 137, 140 (1981) (BWS not sufficiently developed as scientific knowledge); Buhrle v.
State, 627 P.2d 1374, 1378 (Wyo. 1981)(record did not
establish scientific basis). Rejecting this argument, other
courts have concluded that a "sufficient scientific basis"
has been established. State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178,211,478
A.2d 364, 380 (1984). For example, one court has written:
[T]he theory underlying the battered woman's
syndrome has indeed passed beyond the experimental stage and gained a substantial enough scientific
acceptance to warrant admissibility ... [N]umerous
articles and books have been published about the
battered woman's syndrome; and recent findings of
researchers in the field have confirmed its presence
and thereby indicated that the scientific community
accepts its underlying premises. People v. Torres, 128
Misc. 2d 129, 135, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358, 363 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
Accord State v. Hodges, 239 Kan. 63, 716 P.2d 563, 569
(1986); State v. Gallegos, 104 N.M. 247, 719 P.2d 1268,
1274 (N.M. App. Ct. 1986).

Being a battered woman, by itself, is no defense to
homicide. State v. Walker, 40 Wash. App. 658, 665, 700
P.2d 1168, 1173 (1985)("That the defendant is a victim of a
battering relationship is not alone sufficient evidence to
submit the issue of self-defense to a jury."). Nevertheless, the BWS may explain two elements of a selfdefense claim: (1) the defendant's subjective fear of serious injury or death and (2) the reasonableness of that
belief. See generally W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law
§ 5.7 (2d ed. 1986); 2 P. Robinson, Criminal Law
Defenses § 132 (1984). A number of courts recognize the
relevancy of BWS evidence for this purpose. E.g., Terry v.
State, 467 So. 2d 761, 763-64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985);
Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801, 806-07 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1982); State v. Hundley, 235 Kan. 461, 467, 693 P.2d
475, 479 (1985); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892, 894 (Me.
1981); State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 202-05, 478 A.2d 364,
375-77 (1984); State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 820
(N.D. 1983); People v. Torres, 128 Misc. 2d 129, 134, 488
N.Y.S.2d 358, 362 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985). See also May v.
State, 460 So. 2d 778, 78.5 (Miss. 1984)("the battered wife
syndrome has important informational and explanatory
power ..."). For example, BWS evidence is relevant to
explain why the battered woman has not left her mate.
According to one court, "[o]nly by understanding these
unique pressures that force battered women to remain
with their mates, despite their long-standing and
reasonable fear of severe bodily harm and the isolation
that being a battered woman creates, can a battered

Related Issues
The battered woman syndrome has generated a
number of incidental issues. One court has held
evidence of the defendant's prior aggressive behavior
toward the victim inadmissible to rebut BWS evidence.
State v. Kelly, 102 Wash.2d 188, 685 P.2d 564 (1984).
Another court found that defense counsel's failure to
introduce expert testimony on the battered woman
syndrome did not constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel. Meeks v. Bergen, 749 F.2d 322, 328 (6th Cir.
1984). In the trial of a man for the attempted murder of hi!
wife, a New Hampshire court upheld the introduction of
BWS evidence to rebut an insanity defense. State v.
2

Baker, 120 N.H. 773, 775-76, 424 A.2d 171, 173 {1980). In
Jahnke v. State,· 682 P.2d 991, 997 (Wyo. 1984), the court
rejected the admissibility of "battered son" testimony
because the evidence showed that the defendant was
not under attack at the time of the killing.

psychological and demographic profile of typical abusing
parents. It is offered to show that the defendant, the
parent, fits the profile and thus is more likely to have
battered the child. In sum, the battered child syndrome
focuses on the child's physical condition, while the battering parent profile focuses on the parent's characteristics.

References
The admissibility of expert testimony on BWS has
produced much commentary. See generally Acker &
Tach, Battered Women, Straw Men, and Expert Testimony: A Comment on State v. Kelly, 21 Crim. L. Bull., 125
(1985); Buda & Butler, The Battered Wife Syndrome: A
Backdoor Assault on Domestic Violence, 23 J. Fam. L.
359 (1984-85); Crocker, TheMeaning of Equality For
Battered Women Who Kill Men in Self-Defense, 8 Harv.
Women's L.J. 121 (1985); Eisenberg & Seymour, The SelfDefense Plea and Battered Women, 14 Trial34 (July
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Kentucky, 10 N. Ky. L. Rev. 399 (1983); Schneider, Equal
Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of SelfDefense, 15 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 623 (1980); Note, The
Battered Wife's Dilemma: To Kill or To Be Killed, 32 Hastings L.J. 895 (1981); Note, The Admissibility of Expert
Testimony on Battered Wife Syndrome: An Evidentiary
Analysis, 77 Nw. U.L. Rev. 348 (1982); Note, Battered
Woman Syndrome: Admissibility of Expert Testimony for
the Defense, 47 Mo. L. Rev. 835 (1982); Note, Partially
Determined Imperfect Self-Defense: The Battered Wife
Kills and Tells Why, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 615 (1982); Comment,
Expert Testimony on the Battered Wife Syndrome: A
Question of Admissibility in the Prosecution of the
Battered Wife for the Killing of Her Husband, 27 St. Louis
U. L.J. 407 (1983); Note, The Expert as Educator: A Proposed Approach to the Use of Battered Woman Syndrome Expert Testimony, 35 Vand. L. Rev. 741 (1982);
Comment, The Battered Spouse Syndrome as a Defense
to a Homicide Charge Under the Pennsylvania Crimes
Code, 26 Viii. L. Rev. 105 (1980).

The battering parent profile is an offshoot of the
research on the battered child syndrome. See McCoid,
The Battered Child and Other Assaults Upon the Family:
Part One, 50 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 18-19 (1965); John, Child
Abuse-The Battered Child Syndrome, 2 Am: Jur. Proof of
Facts 2d 365, 404-07 (1974). Researchers have not only
attempted to identify the physical attributes of an abused
child but also the characteristics of parents who abuse
their children. One expert testified that the profile of a
battering parent consists of the following characteristics:
(1) the parent herself is the product of a violent, abusive
environment; (2) the parent is under some kind of chronic
environmental stress, caused, for example, by money or
housing problems, and is frequently a single parent; (3)
the parent has a history of poor social judgment, tending
to be impulsive or explosive under stress; (4) the abused
child is the product of an unplanned or difficult pregnancy; and (5) the abused child is a chronically difficult child.
Sanders v. State, 251 Ga. 70,73-74, 303 S.E.2d 13, 16
(1983). A commentator summarized the profile as
follows:
[A]busing parents seem to have low self esteem, poor
impulse control, low empathy, low frustration tolerance,
and inadequate knowledge of basic child development
and of parenting skills. In addition, they are more likely
than non-abusers to manifest diagnosable psychopathology, or other serious emotional problems.
Apart from such personality characteristics, abusing
parents in the reported studies were themselves almost universally abused or neglected as children. As
adults, they tend to social isolation, and are likely to be
under environmental stress, often belonging to lower
socio-economic groups. Note, The Battering Parent
Syndrome: Inexpert Testimony as Character Evidence,
17 Mich. J. L. Reform 653, 658-59 (1984).

BATTERING PARENT PROFILE
The battering parent profile must be distinguished
from the battered child syndrome. Both issues arise in
cases in which a parent is prosecuted for inflicting injury
to or causing the death of a child. Typically, evidence of
the battered child syndrome involves medical testimony
based on the victim's medical history and injuries; it is
admissible to show that the injuries to the child were
intentional rather than accidental, State v. Tanner, 675
P.2d 539, 543 (Utah 1983)("the pattern of abuse is relevant to show that someone injured the child intentionally,
rather than accidentally."); or to show that "the parent's
explanation of the child's injuries is a fabrication." United
States v. Bowers, 660 F.2d 527, 529 (5th Cir. 1981). Many
courts have permitted this type of expert testimony. E.g.,
State v. Durfee, 322 N.W.2d 778, 783-84 (Minn. 1982);
State v. Holland, 346 N.W.2d 302, 307-08 (S.D. 1984);
Annat., Admissibility of Expert Medical Testimony on
Battered Child Syndrome, 98 A.L.R.3d 306 (1980).
In contrast, the battering parent profile involves the

Admissibility
Only a few courts have considered the admissibility of
the battering parent profile. Several courts have treated
the profile as evidence of the defendant's character; that
is, to show that the defendant matches the profile and
therefore is more likely to have committed the particular
abuse charged. Generally, character evidence is inadmissible unless the defendant first introduces evidence
of his own good character. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)("Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character is
not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in
conformity therewith on a particular occasion ..."). Since
the defendants in these cases had not introduced character evidence, the courts have excluded expert testimony concerning the battering parent profile:
[U]nless a defendant has placed her character in issue
or has raised some defense which the battering parent
syndrome is relevant to rebut, the state may not
introduce evidence of the syndrome, nor may the state
introduce character evidence showing a defendant's
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personality traits and personal history as it$ found~tion
for demonstrating the defendant has the characteristics of a typical battering parent. Sanders v. State, 251
Ga. 70, 76, 303 S.E.2d 13, 18 (1983).
Accord State v. Durfee, 322 N.W.2d 778, 785 (Minn.
1982); State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 64 (Minn. 1981}.
Other courts have held such testimony inadmissible
because it lacks probative value and entails a risk of
unfair prejudice. As one court has noted, such "evidence
invites a jury to conclude that because the defendant has
been identified by ari expert with experience in child
abuse cases as a member of a group having a higher
incidence of child sexual abuse, it is more likely the
defendant committed the crime." State v. Maul, 35 Wash.
App. 287, 293, 667 P.2d 96, 99 (1983). Accord Duley v.
State, 56 Md. App. 275,281,467 A.2d 776,780 (1983).
None of the reported cases has explicitly excluded
evidence of the profile on the ground that it is unreliable.
One court, however, indicated that it would reconsider its
decision to exclude profile evidence if "further evidence
of the scientific accuracy and reliability of syndrome or
profile diagnoses can be established." State v. Loebach,
310 N.W.2d 58, 64 (Minn. 1981}.
The Maine Supreme Court has held expert testimony
on the battering parent profile admissible. The evidence,
however, was offered by the defense in this case. In State
v. Con Iogue, 474 A.2d 167 (Me. 1984}, the defendant
attempted to show that the mother of the child, and not
he, had injured the child. The mother had initially admitted that she had injured the child but later recanted and
testified as a prosecution witness. A prosecution expert
testified that the child was a victim of the battered child
syndrome and on cross-examination stated that the
mother had admitted striking the child. The defense,
however, was preciiJ<:led from eliciti_ngadditional testimony from the expert which would have shown that the
mother had also admitted that she herself had been
abused and that abused children often become abusive
parents. The Maine Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the evidence was relevant to show that the mother
and not the defendant had committed the crime: "[A]
description of battered child syndrome and the likelihood
that [the mother's] own history of child abuse would
predispose her to abuse her own child, would have
allowed the jury to weigh the credibility of [the mother's]
confession against the credibility of her later retraction."ld. at 173.

two-phase process - an acute phase and a long-term
reorganization process. Impact reactions in the acute
phase involve either an "expressed style" in which fear,
anger and anxiety are manifested, or a "controlled style"
in which these feelings are masked by a composed or
subdued behavior. Somatic reactions include physical
trauma, skeletal muscle tension, gastrointestinal irritability, and genitourinary disturbance. In addition, a wide
gamut of emotional reactions, ranging from fear, humiliation, and embarrassment to anger, revenge, and selfblame are exhibited, The second phase, the reorganization phase, typically begins two to six weeks after the
attack, andjs.a Qer:!9_cl_inwhich the victim attempts to
reestablish her life. This period is characterized by motor
activity, such as changing residences, changing telephone numbers, or visiting family members. Nightmares
and dreams are common during this phase. In addition,
victims often suffer rape-related phobias, such as fear of
being alone, fear of having people behind them, and
difficulties in sexual relationships. Burgess & Holmstrom,
Rape Trauma Syndrome, 131 Am. J. Psychiatry 981,
981c84 (1974}.
Numerous other studies elaborated on the initial
research, sometimes confirming the earlier studies and
sometimes adding to them. The focus of this research,
however, was to understand the victim's reactions in
order to provide assistance to the victim. The focus was
not to evaluate a victim's reactions in order to establish
the fact that a rape had occurred, which is how RTS is
sometimes used at trial. The legal commentators
disagree about the value of RTS for this latter purpose.
Some believe that RTS evidence should be admissible.
See Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility, and Rape:
The Rape Trauma Syndrome Issue and Its Implications for
Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 Minn. L. Rev. 395
(1985); Ross;-TheGverlooked Expert in Rape Prosecutions, 14 U. Tol. L Rev. 707 (1983); Comment, Expert
Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome: Admissibility and
Effective Use in Criminal Rape Prosecution, 33 Am. U.L.
Rev. 417 (1984). Others question the scientific basis for
RTS evidence. One commentator, after surveying the
literature, concluded that "definitional problems, biased
research samples, and the inherent complexity of the
phenomenon vitiate all attempts to establish empirically
the causal relationship implicit in the concept of a rape
trauma syndrome." Note, Checking the Allure of
Increased Conviction Rates: The Admissibility of Expert
Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome in Criminal
Proceedings, 70 Va. L. Rev. 1657, 1678 (1984). Some of
the research problems include (1) unrepresentative
samples, (2) the failure to distinguish between victims of
rapes, attempted rapes, and molestation, and (3) the failure to account for individual idiosyncratic and incidentspecific reactions. /d. at 1678-80.

RAPE TRAUMA SYNDROME
The phrase rape trauma syndrome (RTS) was coined
by Burgess and Holstrom to describe the behavioral,
somatic, and psychological reactions of rape and
attempted rape victims. Burgess & Holmstrom, Rape
Trauma Syndrome, 131 Am. J. Psychiatry 981 (1974). See
also Burgess, Rape Trauma Syndrome, 1 Behav. Sci. &
Law 97 (Summer 1983}. Rape trauma.syndrome can be
viewed as a type of post-traumatic stress disorder. See
generally Erlinder, Paying the Price for Vietnam: PostTraumatic Stress Disorder and Criminal Behavior, 25
B.C.L. Rev. 305 (1984}; Symposium, Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorders, 1 Behav. Sci. & Law 7-129 (Summer 1983).
Based on interviews with 146 women, Burgess and
Holmstrom found that victims usually progress through a

Admissibility
The courts have divided on the admissibility of RTS
evidence to establish the fact of rape, i.e., lack of
consent. See Annat., Admissibility, at Criminal Prosecution, of Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome, 42
A.L.R.4th 879 (1985). The Minnesota Supreme Court has
ruled that "[r]ape trauma syndrome is not the type of
scientific test that accurately and reliably determines
4

whether a rape has occurred." State v. Saldana, 324 ·
N.W.2d 227, 229 (Minn. 1982). Accord State v. McGee,
324 N.W.2d 232, 233 (Minn. 1982). See also Allewalt v.
State, 61 Md. App. 503, 516, 487 A.2d 664, 6l0 (1985)
(limited probative value of RTS evidence outweighed by
prejudicial effect), cert. granted, 493 A.2d 351 (1985).
Other courts have excluded RTS evidence because it has
not been generally accepted by the scientific community.
For example, the California Supreme Court lias noted that
rape trauma syndrome was not devised to determine
the "truth" or "accuracy" of a particular past eventi.e., whether, in fact, a rape in the legal sense occurred
- but rather was developed by professional rape
coun_selors as a therapeutic tool, to help identify,
predict and treat emotional problems experienced by
the counselors' clients or patients. People v. Bledsoe,
36 Cal. 3d 236, 249-50, 681 P.2d 291, 300, 203 Cal.
Rptr. 450, 459 (1984).
Thus, according to the court, although generally accepted by the s_cientific community for a therapeutic purpose,
expert testimony on RTS was not generally accepted "to
prove that a rape in fact occurred." /d. at 251, 681 P.2d at
301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460. See also People v. Hampton,
728 P2d 345, 348 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Taylor,
663 S.W.2d 235, 240 (Mo. 1984).
The California Supreme Court, however, apparently
approved the admissibility of RTS where the defendant
suggests to the jury that the conduct of the victim after
the incident, such as a delay in reporting the assault, is
inconsistent with the claim of rape. In this situation, the
court wrote, "expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome
may play a particularly useful role by disabusing the jury
s?me widely ~eld misconceptions about rape and rape
vJctJms, so that 1t may evaluate the evidence free of ...
popular myths." 36 Cal. 3d at 247-48, 681 P.2d at 298, 203
Cal. Rptr. at 457. Several courts have admitted RTS
evidence for this latter purpose. E.g., Commonwealth v.
Gallagher, 353 Pa. Super. 426, 433-35, 510 A.2d 735,
7~8~39 (1986) (RTS syndrome admitted to explain why
VJCtJm could Identify defendant four years after assault
when she could not do so two weeks later); Perez v. State,
653 S.W.2d 878, 882 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983)(in rebuttal
ex~ert explained alleged victim's conduct of passive
resistance during rape).
Other courts, however, have gone beyond this limited
use of RTS evidence and permitted its use to establish
lack of consent. For example, the Kansas Supreme Court
has written:
An examination of the literature clearly demonstrates
that the so-called "rape trauma syndrome" is generally
accepted to be a common reaction to sexual
assault ... As such, qualified expert psychiatric
testimony regarding the existence of rape trauma
syndrome is relevant and admissible in a case such as
this where the defense is consent. State v. Marks, 231
Kan. 645, 654, 647 P2d 1292, 1299 (1982).
The Arizona Supreme Court has reached the same
concl~~ion: "[IJf properly presented by a person qualified
by trammg and experience such as a psychiatrist or
psychologist, ... such evidence is admissible to show
lack of consent. This testimony would not invade the
province of the jury." State v. Huey, 145 Ariz. 59, 699 P.2d
1290, 1294 (1985). Accord State v. Liddell, 685 P.2d 918,

ot
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922-23 (Mont. 1984); State v. Whitman, 16 Ohio App. 3d
246, 247, 475 N.E.2d 486, 488 (1984).
References
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CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
ACCOMMODATION SYNDROME
The phrase "Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation
Syndrome" was coined by Dr. Roland Summit in an article by that title in 7 Child Abuse & Neglect 177 (1983) to
describe five categories of reactions typical of child sexual abuse victims. The first two are preconditions to child
s~x~~l abuse; t_he last three are "sequential contingen~~e~ th~t_vary 1n both form and degree. The five categorIes Identified by Dr. Summit are:
(1) Secrecy: The child receives the message, either
explicitly through threats or admonishments or
implicitly, that the subject is to be kept secret. An
aura of danger and secrecy surrounds the incident(s)./d.181.
(2) Helplessness: The imbalance of power that exists
between child and adult makes the child feel powerless to resist. The feeling of helplessness is
increased when the abuser is a trusted friend or
family member.ld. at 182-83.
(3) Entrapment and Accommodation: The child who
does not seek or receive intervention learns to live
with the sexual abuse in order to survive. In addition
to submitting to the sexual abuse, other examples of
s~rvival mechanisms include turning to imaginary
fnends~ developing multiple personalities, taking
refuge 1n altered states of consciousness, substance
abuse, running away, promiscuity, hysterical
phenomena, delinquency, sociopathy, projection of
rage ahd self-mutilation./d. 184-86.
(4) Delayed, conflicting and unconvincing disclosure:
Rarely will the child report incidents of sexual abuse
immediately upon their occurrence. Because of the
time lapse before report occurs and the emotional
~pheaval experienced by the child, the disclosure is
likely to contain contradictions and misstatements.
Often the disclosure is greeted by disbelief. /d. at
186.
(5) Retraction: "Whatever a child says about sexual
abuse she is likely to reverse it." /d. at 188. Particularly if the abuser is a family member, the child will
attempt to undo the disintegration of the family
caused by the disclosure. /d.
. Typically, testimony concerning the syndrome is
Introduced to explainthe contradictory behavior, such as

delayed disclosure or retraction, of child sexual abuse
victims. However, with varying results, experts have
given opinions relating to whether children lie about
sexual abuse (State v. Brotherton, 384 N .W.2d 375, 379
(Iowa 1986) (excluded), Lantrip v. Commonwealth, 713
S.W.2d 816, 817 (Ky. 1986) (excluded), State v. Myers, 382
N.W.2d 91, 97 (Iowa 1986) (excluded), State v. Raye, 73
N.C. App. 273, 276-77, 326 S.E.2d 333, 335 (1985) (admitted)); whether the child is a victim of sexual abuse
(People v. Draper, 105 Mich. App. 481, 485-88, 389
N.W.2d 89, 92 (1986) (admitted), Allison v. State, 179 Ga.
App. 303, 346 S.E.2d 380, 382-85 (1986) (admitted}, State
v. Jackson, 239 Kan. 463, 721 P.2d 232, 237-38 (1986)
(excluded), State v. Butler, 256 Ga. 448, 349 S.E.2d 684,
68!5 (1986) (admitted), State v. Fitzgerald, 39 Wash. App.
652, 656-57, 694 P.2d 117, 1121 (1985) (excluded), State v.
Kim, 64 Hawaii 598, 601-09, 645 P.2d 1330, 1338-39
(1982) (admitted), State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1200-01
(Utah 1984) (admitted), People v. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App.
3d 1093, 1098-1101,215 Cal. Rptr. 45,48-50 (1985)
(excluded for this purpose)); whether a child's behavior is
consistent with abuse (Russell v. State, 712 S.W.2d 916,
916-17 (Ark. 1986) (excluded), State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz.
472, 720 P.2d 73, 75-76 (1986) (excluded)); the profile of
the child sexual abuse perpetrator (People v. Wilder, 146
Ill. App. 3d 586, 496 N.E.2d 1182, 1185 (1986) (admitted),
State v. Maule, 35 Wash. App. 287, 293, 667 P.2d 96, 99
(1983) (excluded for this purpose), Hall v. State, 15 Ark.
App. 309, 316-17, 692 S.W.2d 769, 773 (1985) (excluded));
and even, whether the defendant sexually abused the
child complainant (Keri v. State, 179 Ga. App. 664, 347
S.E.2d 236, 238 (1986} (admitted), State v. Logue, 372
N.W.2d 151, 157 (S.D. 1985) (excluded), State v. Jackson,
239 Kan.463, 721 P.2d 232, 237-38 (1986) (excluded)).

the evidence or determine a fact in issue, and the qualifications of the witness.
Often in child sexual abuse cases, there is no independent evidence that the sexual abuse occurred:
The sexual offender is often a relative or a trusted adult (
with whom the child spends time alone. Eyewitnesses
to the molestation are therefore rare. In addition, sexual abuse is typically a nonviolent crime. Children who
are abused by a trusted adult usually are manipulated
psychologically and do not resist their abusers. Physical injury can provide valuable medical evidence of the
sexual abuse, but this evidence often is lacking because
the abuse is committed without force. Furthermore, the
sexual abuse may involve an act other than penetration
of the vagina or anus. Crimes such as petting, fondling
or oral copulation usually do not involve forceful physical contact and do not leave physical scars. A lapse of
time between the sexual abuse and disclosure may
also contribute to the lack of medical evidence. Note,
The Admissibility of Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome in California, 17 Pac. L.J. 1368-69 (1986).
Additionally, the typical response of child sexual abuse
victims are counter-intuitive in manyJespects. Delayed
disclosure, conflicting testimony, and retraction suggest
fabrication on the part of the child complainant unless an
explanation is offered for this anomalous behavior. In
those cases where there is no independent evidence that
the abuse occurred, the jury's determination of the credibility of the child complainant and the defendant will be
dispositive. In the words of one court:
It would be useful to the jury to know that not just this
victim but many child victims are ambivalent about the
forcefulness with which they want to pursue the complaint, and it is not uncommon for them to deny the act
ever happenl:l_ci. Explaining this superficially bizarre
behavior by identifying its emotional antecedents could
help the jury better assess the witness' credibility. State
v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 436, 657 P.2d 1215, 1220 (1983).
Another court wrote:
We cannot assume that the average juror is familiar
with the behavioral characteristics of victims of child
molesting. Knowledge of such characteristics may well
aid the jury in weighing the testimony of the alleged
child victim. Children who have been the victims of
sexual abuse or molestation may exhibit behavioral
patterns (e.g. recantation, conflicting versions of
events, confusion or inarticulate descriptions) which
jurors might attribute to inaccuracy or prevarication,
but which may be merely the result of immaturity,
psychological stress, societal pressures or similar
factors as well as of their interaction. Jurors, most of
whom are unfamiliar with the behavioral sciences, may
well benefit from expert testimony of the general type
offered in the present case ... State v. Lindsey, 149
Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73, 74-75 (1986).

Admission
Most of the courts which have considered the admissibility of child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome
evidence have permitted experts to describe and explain
typical reactions of child sexual abuse victims. United
States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336, 340-41 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Binder, 769 F.2d 595, 602 (9th Cir. 1985);
State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73, 74-76 (1986};
People v. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 1098-1101,215
Cal. Rptr. 45, 48-50 (1985); State v. Kim, 64 Hawaii 598,
607, 645 P.2d 1330, 1338 (1982); State v. Myers, 382
N.W.2d 91, 97 (Iowa 1986); State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d
604, 609-610 (Minn. 1984); State v. Middleton, 294 Or.
427, 432-38, 657 P.2d 1215, 1219-21 (1983); State v.
Petrich, 101 Wash. 2d 566, 573-76, 683 P.2d 173, 178-80
(1984).
The admissibility of expert testimony concerning child
sexual abuse accommodation syndrome is analyzed
under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 or the state equivalent, which provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion
or otherwise.

However, the Arkansas Supreme Court excluded an
opinion that the complainant's statements were consistent with sexual abuse, because the evidence was not
beyond the jury's ability to understand and draw its own
conclusions. Russell v. State, 289 Ark. 533, 712 S.W.2d
916, 917 (1986). Two facts distinguish Russell from the
other cases which admitted similar testimony. First, the

The keys to admissibility under Rule 702 are the likelihood that the testimony will assist the jury to understand
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testimony came from the state's first witness and on
direct examination. Thus, the defendant had not had
even the opportunity to attack the complainant's credibility. Second, it does not appear that the child complainant
had displayed the bizarre behavior of the type requiring
explanation.
The conditions of admissibility have not yet developed
sufficiently to provide well-defined guidelines. For
instance, whether testimony on child sexual abuse
accommodation syndrome will be permitted only after
the credibility of the complaining witness has been
attacked is not clear. However, the nature of the child
sexual abuse defense is a denial and necessarily entails
an attack on the credibility of the complaining witness'
testimony.
At least one court of appeals has limited the admissibility of child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome
evidence to circumstances similar to those presented in
the state supreme court case in which it was held admissible. In State v. Hall, 392 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. App. 1986),
the Minnesota Court of Appeals interpreted State v.
Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604 (Minn. 1984), to permit child
sexual abuse accommodation syndrome evidence only
"in cases involving (1) the intra-familial sexual abuse (2)
of a young child where (3) the expert's knowledge would
help the jury to evaluate the credibility of the
complainant." State v. Hall, 392 N.W.2d 285, 289 (Minn.
App. 1986), rehearing granted.
People v. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1099, 215 Cal. Rptr.
45 (1985), analogized child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome to rape trauma syndrome evidence, and
limits expert testimony to rehabilitate the complainant's
credibility "to a discussion of victims as a class, supported by references to literature and experience (such as an
expert normally relies upon) and does not extend to
discussion and diagnosis of the witness in the case at
hand." /d. at 1100, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 50. Accord United
States v. Binder, 769 F.2d 595, 602 (9th Cir. 1985).

expert's opinion would not be helpful. In the words of the
Arizona Supreme Court:
Thus, even where expert testimony on behavioral
characteristics that affect credibility or accuracy of
observation is allowed, experts should not be allowed
to give their opinion of the accuracy, reliability or credibility of a particular witness in the case being tried ...
Opinion evidence on who is telling the truth in cases
such as this is nothing more than the expert's opinion
on how the case should be decided ... [SJuch testimony is inadmissible, both because it usurps the jury's
traditional functions and roles and because, when
given insight into the behavioral sciences, the jury
needs nothing further from the experts. State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73, 76 (1986).
In addition to Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 704,
some courts have considered the effect of Federal Rule
608. United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336, 341 (8th Cir.
1986); State v. Heath, 316 N.C. 337, 341 S.E.2d 565, 567-68
(1986). Rule 608 limits the form which rehabilitation of
credibility may take to opinions as to the witness' character for truthfulness. Thus, Rule 608 precludes an expert
from testifying that a witness is telling the truth on a particular occasion.
However, in State v. Kim, 64 Hawaii 598, 645 P.2d 1330
(1982), the Hawaii Supreme Court permitted an expert to
testify that he found the compiaining witness believable.
The court analyzed the admissibility of the testimony
under Rules 403 and 702 and admitted the testimony
because its probative value outweighed its prejudicial
effect, and the testimony would be helpful to the jury. It
should be noted that even the Hawaii Court expressed
some discomfort in permitting the expert to testify that he
found the complaining witness believable: "The opinion,
in itself, appears to encroach upon the heart of the jury's
f(.!nction of assessing credibility." /d. at 609, 645 P.2d at
1338. The court, however, evidently found that the limitations on such opinion testimony were more a matter of
form than substance, stating, "we hesitate to simply
exclude all such testimony insofar as it may, upon occasion, serve the simple purpose of clarifying and consolidating the gist of the expert's testimony, thereby avoiding
'awkward and confusing circumlocutions.' " /d.
In State v. Butler, 256 Ga. 448, 349 S.E.2d 684, 685-86
(1986), a pediatrician was permitted to testify that, based
on a physical examination of the child and statements
made by the child to the pediatrician, the child was a victim of sexual abuse. This case is distinguishable from the
others discussed in that the expert was a pediatrician, and
the opinion was based in part on a physical examination
of the child which revealed evidence of sexual abuse.

Exclusion
Many of those courts that admit expert testimony
explaining or describing typical reactions of child sexual
abuse victims exclude conclusions drawn by the experts
as to whether the children involved are telling the truth,
whether the children involved are victims of sexual
abuse, and whether children in general lie about sexual
abuse. United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336, 340-41 (8th
Cir. 1986); State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73,
76-77 (1986); People v. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093,
1099-1101, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45, 50 (1985); State v. Myers,
382 N.W.2d 91, 95-97 (Iowa 1986); State v. Jackson, 239
Kan. 463, 721 P.2d 232, 237-38 (1986); State v. Myers, 359
N.W.2d 604, 611 (Minn. 1984); State v. Middleton, 294 Or.
427, 438, 657 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1983).
The reasoning the courts use to exclude expert
testimony on the issue of credibility is that such conclusions usurp the tact-finding/credibility determining function ot the jury. Federal Rule of Evidence 704 permits
some opinion evidence that embraces ultimate issues of
tact. However, Rule 704 must be read in conjunction with
the requirement of Rule 702 that the opinion be helpful to
the trier of fact. Because there is no proven method for
determining whether a witness is telling the truth, the

Related Issues
An issue related to child sexual abuse accommodation
syndrome is whether an expert should be permitted to
testify that the defendant fits a child sexual abuser
profile, or exhibits characteristics identified with higher
incidence of child sexual abuse. Hall v. State, 15 Ark.
App. 309, 692 S.W.2d 769 (1985); People v. Wilder, 146 Ill.
App. 586, 496 N.E.2d 1182, 1185 (1986); State v. Petrich,
101 Wash. 2d 566, 683 P.2d 173 (1984). Such testimony is
subject to the balancing analysis of Federal Rule of
Evidence 403, and is excluded if the court determines
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tnanlie prejudicial effect of identifying the defendant as a
member of a class with a higher rate of child sexual
abuse outweighs the probative value of the testimony. In
Hall v. State,J5 Ark. App. 309, 316-17, 692 S.W.2d 769,
773 (1985), and State v. Petrich, 101 Wash. 2d 566, 576,
683 P.2d 173, 180 (1984), the testimony which matched
defendant's characteristics with traits of child sexual
abusers was deemed overly prejudicial and was, theretore, excluded.
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